

**Mapping the Repertoire of Emotions
and their Communicative Functions in Face-to-face Diplomacy**

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Abstract

Leaders who wish to resolve their disputes through face-to-face negotiations often find themselves in various relational problems. An invitation to talk might be sincere, but it can also be a scheme to exploit one's counterpart; a claim of value and threat to walk out unless certain demands are met might be serious, but it can also be a bluff; a claim that no further concessions is possible might be heartfelt, but it can also be an attempt to exaggerate one's "reservation price"; and an urge to commit to an agreement might be genuine, but it can also be a ploy to trick a counterpart into a deal one does not intend to honor. What, then, are the interpersonal mechanisms that enable leaders to credibly communicate their intentions? In this article, I identify the diverse repertoire of emotions that leaders exchange when they interact up close, explain the different relational problems they overcome, and as such, shed light on how their expressions enable leaders with otherwise conflicting interests to proceed through the different stages of a negotiation. Empirically, I present a number of episodes of face-to-face diplomacy in recent history. I discuss a number of topics for further research in the conclusion.

“We saw many conflicts emerge and saw them resolved, but not without strained negotiations, claims and counterclaims, and emotional debates.” – Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador to the US, reminiscing his career that spanned over six American Presidents (Dobrynin 1995, 5).

Negotiations are an ever-present feature of international politics. According to Jackson, there were 295 violent international disputes from 1945 to 1995. Among them, 171 (or 58%) experienced negotiations.¹ The total number of negotiation attempts pertaining to these disputes was 1,154; 47% of them had successfully led to a dispute’s resolution (Jackson 2000, 329-31). Direct negotiations are important to peace, he concludes, because “when neither party [to a dispute] is prepared to meet face-to-face and messages have to be relayed between them, this increases the chances of misperception and miscommunication” (Jackson 2000, 338). As Boyer et al. (2009) put it, “interpersonal interactions occurring in the international negotiation context are at times the only thin standing between war and peace” (25). Successful or not in the end, the meetings between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore and between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki in the summer of 2018 are but the two latest examples in which leaders have attempted to reconcile their differences – or at least, to better understand each other – through face-to-face diplomacy.

Leaders have long understood the need to meet each other in person. François de Callières wrote over three centuries ago: “it is always more advantageous for the practised diplomatist to negotiate face to face, because by that means he can discover the true intentions of those with whom he is dealing.” (de Callières [1716]1963, 120). “[I]t is impossible to form a just notion of the true character of things except by first-hand acquaintance,” he opined (47-48). Leaders in the modern days would agree. “I was to find throughout my years as [US] Secretary [of State] that travel was an efficient use of time,” Madeleine Albright wrote in her memoir, “because face-to-face meetings were action-forcing” (Albright 2003, 277). Recent advances in information and communications technology – and with them, the rise of “digital diplomacy” as a means of statecraft (Bjola and Holmes 2015; Sandre 2015) – are, in the final analysis, no substitute for personal interactions, especially if one wishes to assess intentions (Holmes 2015b). As Condoleezza Rice put it, “with all the technological possibilities of phone and video,

¹ An earlier study by Holsti similarly shows that of the 77 international conflicts that occurred between 1919 and 1965, there were 47 attempts to resolve them through direct negotiations (Holsti 1966, 284-6).

diplomacy is [still] best practiced in person” (Rice 2012, 291). “[P]hysical presence trumps electronic presence,” Colin Powell similarly proclaimed (Powell 2014, 56). In one of the ten “Parting Thoughts for America’s Diplomats” offered upon his retirement, William Burns, a 33-year veteran at the US Department of State, admonished his colleagues to “[m]aster the fundamentals.” “In today’s world of digital and virtual relationships,” he explained, “there is still no alternative to old-fashioned human interactions – not in business, romance, or diplomacy.” Quoting an advice that another respected diplomat put forth over half-century earlier, Burns continued: “The really critical link in the international communications chain is the last three feet, which is best bridged by personal contact – one person talking to another” (Burns 2014).

However, intentions are often far from clear, even when leaders are only feet apart. This is because they are at the same time inclined to disclose their preferences, beliefs and goals (in order to ensure that a middle ground satisfactory to all parties can be identified and agreed upon) and to be dishonest about them (to ensure that one ends up in the best position possible whether an agreement is eventually reached or not). In Schelling’s words, they have “mixed motives” (Schelling 1960). For a negotiation to proceed, leaders must overcome a number of relational problems that arise as a result. For instance, an invitation to talk might be sincere, but it can also be a scheme to exploit one’s counterpart at the negotiation table; as a negotiation proceeds, a claim of value and threat to walk out unless certain demands are met might be serious, but it can also be a bluff; a claim that no further concessions is possible might be heartfelt, but it can also be an attempt to exaggerate one’s “reservation price”; and towards the end, an urge to commit to an agreement might be genuine, but it can also be a ploy to trick a counterpart into a deal one does not intend to honor. What, then, are the interpersonal mechanisms that enable leaders to communicate intentions?

In this article, I build upon findings from recent research in social and experimental psychology and discuss how different emotions function to overcome the different relational problems that leaders encounter in a negotiation. As such, I am primarily interested in what psychologists call an “emotional expression” rather than “emotional experience.” The former, as Burgoon, Guerrero, and Floyd (2010) explain, is the “external, interpersonal part of emotion”; the latter is “internal” and “intrapersonal.” Expression is “what we show to others”; experience is

“what occurs within our minds and bodies” (288).² In short, I argue that expressions of emotions such as liking and interest initiate talks; anger and contempt claim values; exasperation and disappointment bind a counterpart to an agreement; and fear and worry convey commitment. To illustrate my argument, I present a number of episodes of face-to-face diplomacy from recent history.

This article makes a number of contributions. First, most people would suppose that face-to-face diplomacy is crucial to how countries manage their relationships, and more specifically, work out their differences (Sharp 2011, 709). But scholars of International Relations (IR), especially in the American academe, have tended to focus on structural explanations, be they material (e.g. neorealism and neoliberalism), informational (rationalism), or ideational (constructivism). Diplomacy has been seen as unimportant or at best epiphenomenal. As Melissen (2011) noted in a discussion on diplomatic studies in the *International Studies Review* several years ago, “mainstream IR [had] developed in a way that left little room for those who believed that diplomacy matters” (723). Wiseman (2011) similarly observed in the same occasion that the literature had “long overlooked diplomacy, generally showing little interest in what diplomacy is, in what diplomats do, and, indeed, in what diplomats should do” (710). Such inattention is puzzling, as diplomacy has for long been both a tool in service of a country’s interests and a routine feature of international politics (Lebovic and Saunders 2016; Henke 2017).

In recent years, a number of scholars have sought to remedy such “structural bias” in the literature and theorize how diplomacy at the “micro” level of individual leaders “works.”³ They have done so by leveraging insights from other germane disciplines, notably psychology and neuroscience (e.g. Hall and Yarhi-Milo 2012; Holmes 2013; 2016; 2018; Yarhi-Milo 2014; Hall 2015; Wong 2016; Forthcoming; Holmes and Yarhi-Milo 2016; Wheeler 2018). A general theme

² Both aspects of emotions influence the course and outcome of an interaction – in a negotiation or other social settings – but scholars have in the past paid far more attention to experience than to expression. This imbalance has been a subject of much criticism over the years (see, for instance, Parkinson 1996; Barry, Fulmer, and Van Kleef 2004, 83; Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead 2010, 46; and Van Kleef and Côté 2018). For an overview of research in psychology on the relationship between the two aspects of emotions, see Metts and Planalp 2011. For relatively rare (and recent) examples of studies that examine their interplay in the context of a negotiation, see Jäger, Loschelder, and Friese 2017; and Methasani, Gaspar, and Barry 2017.

³ For discussions on the discipline’s broader turn towards the microfoundations of international politics, see Kertzer 2017; Solomon and Steele 2017; Stein 2017.

in this literature has been that diplomacy communicates intentions because of the emotional dynamics that transpire in interpersonal interactions.

However, as Koschut (2017) argued in a recent forum discussion in the *International Studies Review* (at the suggestion of Todd Hall), it is time to “go beyond the ‘emotions matter’ approach” of what he calls “the first wave of emotions scholarship in IR,” and “offer more specific ways to integrate the consideration of emotion into existing research” (482). This article proceeds in that direction. In particular, I identify the diverse repertoire of emotions that leaders exchange when they interact up close, explain the different relational problems they overcome, and as such, shed light on how their expressions enable leaders with otherwise conflicting interests to proceed through the different stages of a negotiation and achieve cooperative outcomes.

Second, Dobrynin’s assertion in the opening quotation – that “emotional debates” were part and parcel to the resolution of conflicts in US-Soviet relations – may sound obvious. After all, we all have experience with negotiations, in our relationships and everyday life, and can attest to their emotional nature. As Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead remark, “[i]f two parties have a difference of opinion but neither has an emotional reaction, there will be no negotiation” (Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead 2004, 57). However, the academic literature on negotiations – in psychology, economics and political science – have until recently tended to focus on their cognitive dimension (Pruitt 1981, 175; Neale and Northcraft 1991, 170; Bazerman et al. 2000, 285; Barry, Fulmer, and Van Kleef 2004, 71; for an overview and critique, see Van Kleef and Sinaceur 2013). As one scholar puts it, a negotiation had for a long time been construed “as a ‘problem’ to be ‘solved,’ rather than as a context for human interaction with all of its social and emotional baggage” (Barry 2008, 97). The research on negotiations in IR (e.g. Odell 2000; Rathbun 2014; McKibben 2015), which has derived many of its insights from findings in psychology (and perhaps because of that), suffers from a similar bias. As Odell and Tingley suggest in their review of this literature, an “important theoretical line of development [in future research] is to investigate... how and why emotions have an impact... Most negotiation and bargaining research has sidestepped this question” (Odell and Tingley 2013, 171).⁴ With its focus on emotions, this article would find a receptive audience among negotiation researchers.

⁴ This, as feminist scholars have argued, may be due to the gendered nature of IR scholarship, and research in the social sciences more generally, in which emotions, a supposedly feminine

Finally, IR has witnessed a proliferation of works on emotions in recent years.⁵ But as Hall and Ross (2015) noted, these works have been primarily interested in the causal power of emotions “at the level of the state and other corporate actors” (10).⁶ Among research that investigate the role of emotions at the individual level of analysis, the lion’s share of attention has been given to their influence on the beliefs and behavior of the person (usually leader) experiencing them (e.g. Hymans 2006; Mercer 2013; 2017; Holmes 2015a; Holmes and Traven 2015; Traven 2015; Dolan 2016; Markwica 2018), rather than their effect, as expressions, on interpersonal communication.⁷ The latter, however, bears important consequences on how leaders interact with each other, particularly in the context of a negotiation. As Morris and Keltner note, “researchers have focused on how individual’s general affective state impacts that individual’s information processing tendencies.” But such approach “misses the central way that emotions function in negotiation – that is, one’s emotional expression affects others who observe it.” Take, for instance, former US President Bill Clinton, who seems to be able “to use emotions to negotiate... [his] way out of seemingly any predicament.” But “[t]he key is not how Clinton’s emotions impact Clinton’s cognition,” they argue, “it is how Clinton’s emotional expressions impact his audience’s cognitions and emotions” (Morris and Keltner 2000, 2). This article is among the first to theorize and illustrate through a number of episodes the communicative functions of different emotions in face-to-face diplomacy, and as such, fills an important lacuna in the literature.⁸

attribute, are often assumed to be baneful and therefore an unwelcomed influence on rational decision-making and communication, including those that occur between leaders in the context of a negotiation (see, for example, the forum discussion in Sylvester 2011).

⁵ For a review, see Hutchison and Bleiker 2014. See also Ariffin, Coicaud and Popovski 2016 and the forum discussion in Koschut et al. 2017.

⁶ See, for instance, Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Crawford 2014; Eznack 2011; Fattah and Fierke 2009; Gries 2004; Hall 2015; Koschut 2014; Linklater 2014; Mercer 2014; Ross 2014; Sasley 2011; and Solomon 2014.

⁷ Again, this perhaps reflects a similar trend in psychology, which has informed much of the research on emotions in IR (see fn. 2 above).

⁸ Psychologists would also recognize the value of this article. Most of their research on negotiations have been conducted through the use of convenience samples in laboratory experiments (Druckman 2011), and are therefore often criticized for their lack of external validity and mundane realism (i.e. how realistic is the environment of a laboratory as a reproduction of the negotiation experience?). One solution, as Pruitt and Carnevale have long suggested, would be to “do parallel research in laboratory and natural settings. Such studies complement each other. The laboratory research helps to clarify causal mechanisms, while the

This article proceeds in the following manner. First, I discuss in greater detail the reasoning behind the different relational problems in a negotiation, and suggest how emotions serve to overcome them. In the second section, I map out the repertoire of emotions that enable a negotiation to proceed from beginning to end, illustrating my argument along the way with a number of episodes of face-to-face diplomacy. To conclude, I summarize my argument and outline several promising avenues for further research. They include the need to better understand the consequences of different sequencings and mixes of emotional expressions, the effects of leaders' emotional intelligence on negotiation processes and outcomes, how the cultural backgrounds of leaders affect the expressions and interpretation of emotions, how leaders differ in their reliance on face-to-face diplomacy as a means to communicate intentions, and the implications of future advances in information and communication technology.

Relational problems in negotiations and emotions as their solution

What is a negotiation? According to Pruitt and Carnevale's widely-referenced definition in negotiations research, it is "a discussion between two or more parties aimed at resolving incompatible goals" (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993, xv). In IR, Odell has provided a similar definition: a negotiation is "a sequence of actions in which two or more parties address demands and proposals to each other for the ostensible purposes of reaching an agreement and changing the behavior of at least one actor" (Odell 2000, 4). A negotiation – in diplomacy or other social settings – involves the exchange of information concerning one's intentions so that the parties involved can make the necessary demands and concessions to arrive at a cooperative outcome.

However, when they negotiate, leaders often find themselves under both the incentive to be truthful about their intentions *and* to be deceitful. On the one hand, they are inclined to reveal their goals, belief and preferences because, as proponents of the rationalist bargaining model argue, meeting each other "half-way" within a "bargaining range" would be better than allowing a negotiation to fall through and therefore having no agreement at all (Fearon 1995).

Paradoxically, however, they are also inclined to conceal or even misrepresent what is in their mind, because in the case that an agreement is attainable, one would rather have a larger share of

natural research establishes the relevance of these mechanisms to real-life negotiation" (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993, 11). Barry (2008) has similarly advised researchers "to leave the comfortable confines of the laboratory in favor of observational and ethnographic studies of 'live' negotiation encounters" (103). The episodes presented in this article achieve just that.

the pie, and in the case that the negotiation fails, one would want to be in an optimal position *ex post*. Thus, they often find themselves in what scholars of negotiation call the “negotiator’s dilemma” (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993, 18, 24; Lax and Sebenius 1986).

Table 1

Negotiation stage	Relational problem	Emotions involved	Episodes
1. Opening	Initiation	Liking, interest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sadat-Begin (1978) • Carter-Rabin (1977) • Eisenhower-Khrushchev (1959)
2. Positioning	Influence	Anger, contempt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rice-Putin (2006) • Macmillan-Khrushchev (1958)
3. Endgame	Binding	Exasperation, disappointment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baker-Assad (1991) • Milosevic-Holbrooke (1995)
4. Sealing the deal	Commitment	Fear, worry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kennedy-Dobrynin (1962)

Such a dilemma poses a number of relational problems at different stages of a negotiation that make intentions far from certain (Table 1). At the beginning, why would leaders, who are otherwise in an antagonistic relationship, believe that a counterpart is serious about resolving their dispute? The decision to engage in a negotiation can be costly given the time, energy and resources it demands. Negotiation also exposes one to potential harm because certain alternatives are lost – at least temporarily – such as the opportunity to act unilaterally or to strive for a better deal with a third party. Negotiation also requires the revelation of goals, preferences and strategy, which can undermine one’s bargaining power in current or future interactions. Worse still, a counterpart may actually be seeking to buy time rather than resolving a dispute cooperatively. How, then, can leaders divine if a counterpart’s intention to negotiate is sincere? Such dilemma of “whether to ‘give it a shot’” poses what Morris and Keltner call the “initiation” problem (Morris and Keltner 2000, 25). As one scholar puts it, before a negotiation can begin, the parties involved need to “feel out” if the effort is worth their while (Pruitt 1981, 5). They would not proceed until they feel that the opportunity is ripe. “Ripeness,” as Zartman (2016)

notes, “is a matter of perception, a subjective appreciation strengthened by but independent of objective evidence” (210). Simply put, leaders need to know that a counterpart is serious.

Once a negotiation has begun, leaders enter the stage of “contention and positioning,” during which they stake claims over the disputed issues (Morris and Keltner 2000, 27; see also Pruitt 1981, 131-135; Pruitt and Carnevale 1993, 30-35). According to rationalist logic, leaders would be inclined to claim more than their true “reservation price” or “bottom line,” so that their payoffs could be maximized in the event of an agreement (Fearon 1995). They might even threaten to walk out if certain demands are not met. Such incentives could cause a negotiation to break down, since they might cause leaders to falsely conclude that no mutually agreed settlement is possible (or in rationalist language, that a “bargaining range” does not exist). The relational problem that leaders find themselves at this stage is therefore one of “influence”: the need to credibly establish one’s position in the mind of a counterpart on the one hand, and conversely, to ascertain if a counterpart’s claim of value is heartfelt or if the threat that often comes with it is merely a bluff (Morris and Keltner 2000, 28).

Moving on, at some point after leaders have staked their claims and made the necessary compromises and concessions (colloquially known as the process of “give-and-take”), they need to forestall additional demands or attempts by a counterpart to backtrack on what has already been agreed upon, and convince each other that whatever is on the table is the best that they can achieve. They, in other words, have reached the “endgame.” Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) call such an exercise “positional commitments” (32). But how can one tell if a counterpart is speaking her mind when such an assertion is made? The relational problem that leaders need to overcome at this stage is therefore “to lock in or bind the opponent to a deal” (Morris and Keltner 2000, 33).

Finally, a deal is meaningless – or as the saying goes, “not worth the paper it is written on” – unless a leader believes that a counterpart intends to follow through and honor it. Moreover, trust between parties may be particularly low after the build-up of tensions in the preceding stages. The relational problem is thus one of “commitment,” which, as scholars of IR have pointed out, is often a reason why negotiations and bargaining break down (Fearon 1995; Powell 2006). How, then, are leaders able to overcome this problem?

As Wong (2016) has suggested recently, emotions communicate intentions in face-to-face diplomacy. Emotional expressions, including verbal content, facial cues and body

language, are informative about one's goals, preferences and beliefs because they reflect one's appraisal of an ongoing interaction along various cognitive dimensions (or "themes"). For instance, a leader who reciprocates a counterpart's expressed interest to talk with a show of positive emotion (e.g. a smile) would suggest that she welcomes the counterpart's move. A leader who reacts angrily and surprisingly to a counterpart's demand signifies that in her appraisal (consciously or otherwise), this latest development is not what she has expected, it prevents her from attaining her goals and is unfair to her, and the counterpart is to blame. As Darwin (1872/1999), James (1884) and contemporary scholars of emotions such as Ekman (1993) and Frank (1988) have argued, emotions have a social function to serve.

Moreover, the communicative power of emotions is derived from their nature as both what Jervis (1970) calls "indices" and "signals" of intentions. Feigned or not, emotions have communicative value. As a number of IR scholars have pointed out lately (e.g. Yarhi-Milo 2014, 18; Wong 2016, 154-6; Holmes 2018, 35-6; Wheeler 2018, 6-7), when people interact and are able to observe each other up close, emotions are to a certain extent "indices" – that is, they are inherently reliable as evidence of intentions – because authentic expressions are oftentimes irrepressible, spontaneous and beyond an actor's ability to manipulate. On the other hand, if a counterpart does attempt to fake an emotion, chances are that a leader would suspect that it is far from genuine.

Emotions are also "signals" because what people make of an expression is often a function of the social context. In face-to-face diplomacy, past interactions and certain norms, practices and protocols – for instance, that some basic cordiality is expected, that leaders normally remain composed in front of each other, etc. – inform leaders' expectations of each other's behavior. This means that any occasional deviation from them could be seen as a statement of intention, even if it is deliberate and "staged" and a counterpart suspects so. It is the willingness to upset what has been the *modus operandi* of a particular relationship or how leaders should behave in diplomacy that sends a signal (Wong 2016, 156-159). An opponent who has taken great pains to maintain a straight face in previous meetings but greets a leader with a smile this time round – even if it looks contrived – would suggest interest to engage. An ally who is normally collegial but becomes upset – again, even if it appears feigned – at a

leader's demand at the negotiation table is probably trying to express her dissatisfaction.⁹ Authenticity adds weight to an emotion's credibility, but its lack thereof does not vitiate its communicative function. As Madeleine Albright wrote, diplomatic negotiations "inevitably lead to some playacting. Sometimes it's useful to pretend that you have a warmer relationship than you actually do. At other times, a show of anger or walking out is useful" (Albright 2003, 620).

A negotiation, as the definitions provided earlier suggest, is at the heart of it a process of communicating intentions. It is therefore not surprising that emotions often flare. Negotiations among leaders are no exception. As Hillary Clinton notes in her memoir as the US Secretary of State, "[t]he public portion of international meetings... is typically scripted. Each country and organization states its position, and it can be rather boring. The action generally starts when the cameras leave. That's what happened here" – referring to the meeting she had with the foreign ministers of the other powers concerned in June 2012 to negotiate an end to the Syrian civil war. "We left the ceremonial hall and crowded into a long rectangular room," she continues, "Emotions ran high; at one point Ministers were shouting at one another and even pounding the table" (Clinton 2014, 458). Emotions could, in the most extreme scenario, even trump words as expressions of intentions. "For two more hours [Serbian President Slobodan] Milosevic and [Bosnian Prime Minister Haris] Silajdzic argued, yelled, and drew wide, sweeping lines on the maps," Richard Holbrooke, the chief American negotiator, recalls on the Dayton Accords negotiations that ended the Bosnian War in November 1995. "Translation was almost unnecessary – the body language, the hand gestures, the emotions told the story" (Holbrooke 1998, 299).

Emotions and the communicative functions they serve

But what intentions do emotions convey? In general, negative emotions (such as anger) signify that a counterpart should adjust her behavior, while positive emotions (such as liking) beckon one to stay on course (Cacioppo and Gardner 1999). At a more differentiated level, however, different emotions reveal different intentions. As such, they enable leaders to overcome the different relational problems.

⁹ For an analogous discussion on how negative emotions hold together allies in times of crisis, albeit at the interstate rather than interpersonal level, see Eznack 2011.

Emotions that initiate talks

Research in psychology, sociology and ethology have shown that positive emotions such as *liking* and *interest* – expressed through eye contacts, smiles, head nods, and certain other verbal, hand and body gestures – are conducive to engagement (Van Doorn, Heerdink, and Van Kleef 2012; Krumhuber et al. 2007; Johnston, Miles, and Macrae 2010; Belkin and Rothman 2017; Martin et al. 2017; see also Levine et al. 2018), including in the context of a negotiation (Kopelman, Rosette, and Thompson 2006). At the beginning of an interpersonal interaction, these emotions “induce in the other a willingness to talk.” They are “strong triggers of reciprocity,” and “lubricate and set in motion the process of negotiation” (Morris and Keltner 2000, 26-27).¹⁰ They, in other words, provide a solution to the “initiation” problem.

According to rationalist reasoning, leaders would be inclined to articulate their resolve to continue on with a conflict (e.g. to fight in the case of a war) rather than settling their differences through negotiations in order to establish a strong position upfront (Fearon 1995, 395-401). To demonstrate any sign of goodwill would suggest an eagerness to make peace, and as such, undercut one’s position. As Morris and Keltner note, “[f]rom a purely rational standpoint it is puzzling why negotiators insist that cooperativeness be displayed in the opening rounds when they are more forgiving of competitiveness in later phases of the negotiation” (Morris and Keltner 2000, 25).

In reality, and particularly in the context of face-to-face diplomacy, such expressions of goodwill do not necessarily signify weakness. As mentioned, leaders are normally expected to be courteous to each other, especially when they first meet, and even if a relationship is tense. As Richard Holbrooke note, “the normal pattern in international diplomacy [is] of outward cordiality masking animosity” (Holbrooke 1998, 116). A leader’s willingness to play by such unspoken rule of diplomacy at the beginning of a negotiation might simply mean that she intends to continue on with the interaction – that is, to “initiate” a negotiation – without necessarily showing a willingness to budge when substantive issues are discussed later.

¹⁰ See also Pruitt and Carnevale (1993, 99-100) on the importance of creating positive “mood states” at the beginning of a negotiation.

The interaction between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin during their initial meeting at Camp David in September 1978 is a case in point.

With US President Jimmy Carter as the host and mediator, the two leaders underwent twelve days of secret negotiations at the US presidential retreat in Maryland. On their agenda were the normalization of relations between the two countries, the sovereignty of the Sinai Peninsula and the Palestinian territories, Jewish settlements and other important issues concerning the Middle East. On the third day, the negotiation eventually turned into an “unpleasant and heated argument” – that is, as I explain below, it entered the stage of “positioning and contention” – with neither side willing to budge (Carter 1995, 350). But in their first meeting the day before, the two leaders went out of their way to show interest and express liking. According to Carter, at one point, Begin said “with some emotion” that they needed to “start a new page and forget past disagreements.” Sadat responded, “Yes, yes.” After some further discussions, Begin commented that “when the Catholics choose a new pope, they say ‘Habemus Papum’ (We have a new pope). He wanted us to be able to announce, ‘Habemus Pace’ (We have peace).” Sadat, perhaps surprisingly for him as an Arab leader, replied that “he hoped that the spirit of *King* David, the great leader of Israel, would prevail at *Camp* David” (emphasis original).

Later in the meeting, Sadat made the first move. He presented, in Carter’s words, an “extremely tough and unacceptable proposal” and requested that Begin not to respond until he had consulted his aides. As Sadat was reading his proposal, Carter noticed that Begin “sat without changing his emotion,” but the President could “feel the tension building.” To break the tension, Carter joked that if Begin would sign the proposal as it was, they could all save time. Carter, however, was “surprised when everyone broke into gales of genuine laughter... All of a sudden both men seemed happy, friendly.” After agreeing to meet again the next day, they “parted in good spirits, everyone patting each other on the back,” Carter continued. “It was the high point in feeling until the final hours, many days later” (Carter 1995, 344-6).

The relationship between the two leaders soured dramatically after their second meeting. In the end, it took an empathetic mediator, Carter, to overcome the mistrust and ill will to come up with an agreement (Holmes and Yarhi-Milo 2016, 111-4). I would argue, however, that the negotiation would not have even started had Sadat and Begin not demonstrated affectively their

intention to proceed, even if both suspected, if not knowing for sure, that the other side was far from sincere and was only acting out of courtesy.

Consider a counterexample, also from Carter's experience, when he met with Begin's predecessor, Yitzhak Rabin, a year earlier. Carter was hoping the Israeli leader would sign on to the Middle East peace negotiations he had been pioneering since coming into office as President two months earlier in January. Rabin, however, was far from enthusiastic. According to Carter, he was "very timid, very stubborn, and also somewhat ill at ease." Carter felt like he was "talking to a dead fish... [Rabin's] strange reticence caused me to think again about whether we should launch another major effort for peace" (Carter 1995, 287). As Holmes has argued after reviewing the Israeli position at the time, "Carter might have been accurately reading between the lines... because there was a reluctance [among the Israelis] to become involved in the... peace process" (Holmes 2016, 295).

A similar exchange occurred nearly two decades earlier, when US President Dwight Eisenhower and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev met in September 1959, again at Camp David.

On the whole, their two-day summit was a success. In November the previous year, Khrushchev issued an ultimatum demanding the Western powers to leave Berlin within six months; he withdrew it after the summit. On the other hand, Eisenhower acknowledged that their impasse over Berlin was unacceptable, and that a solution should be sought through further negotiations. They also agreed to meet again the following year, and Eisenhower would reciprocate with a visit to the Soviet Union (Taubman 2003, 438-9). However, the US President also made clear through his body language – or lack thereof – that certain topics were nonnegotiable. As Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister, recalled: "I remember how stubbornly Western leaders resisted discussing the question of their foreign bases." While Eisenhower was listening to Khrushchev on the subject, his "face was stony, his gaze fixed somewhere just above his guests' heads, if not higher. This was not the Eisenhower who had been widely advertised as the man who just couldn't help smiling" (Gromyko 1989, 136). Like Rabin, he was in effect letting it known that he had no interest in admitting the subject into the negotiation.

Emotions that claim values

Once the leaders have “broken the ice” and entered the stage of “positioning,” the exchange of emotions such as *anger* and *contempt* enables them to overcome the relational problem of “influence,” because such emotions “provide important information about... preferences, positions, and concerns” (Morris and Keltner 2000, 31). Psychological experiments on negotiations have shown that a counterpart who reacts angrily to a proposal or demand is more likely to extract concessions (e.g. Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead 2004; Sinaceur and Tiedens 2006; Van Beest, Van Kleef, and Van Kijk 2008; Wang, Northcraft, and Van Kleef 2012; Sinaceur et al. 2013; Fassina and Whyte 2014; for a review, see Hunsaker 2017). Expressions of contempt evince moral concern (Kupfer and Giner-Sorolla 2017), and could signify one’s readiness to sever the relationship if a counterpart does not change course (Fischer and Roseman 2007). Pertinent behaviors include “aggressive glaring stares,” “thrusting back-handed gestures,” and certain tone, volume, postures and gestures that evince dominance and assertiveness (Morris and Keltner 2000, 28-30).

The use of such “dominance” emotions to establish one’s position is ubiquitous in diplomacy. Leaders are wont to recall the heated debates they have with each other. In the Sadat-Begin episode just discussed, congeniality gave way to heated exchanges the following day. As the two leaders haggled over Sadat’s opening proposal, they volleyed angry words, tones and gestures at each other (pointing fingers, pounding the table, etc.). As Carter recalled, “[a]ll restraint was now gone. Their faces were flushed, and the niceties of diplomatic language and protocol were stripped away” (Carter 1995, 351).

A more recent but no less dramatic example came from Condoleezza Rice’s tenure as the US Secretary of State.

In late-October 2006, Rice visited Moscow to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior officials. The main issue on their agenda was North Korea, which had shocked the world with the testing of a nuclear device two weeks earlier. There were, however, other “sticky issues” to address, notably the “real storm clouds concerning Georgia” (Rice 2012, 531). Since September, Georgia had detained several Russian officers on spying charges. In return, Russia imposed economic sanctions and withdrew its embassy from Tbilisi. Relations between the two countries were deteriorating dramatically. At one point during their meeting,

Rice asked that she and Putin talk privately. Their conversation started off “cordially.” But when Rice switched topics to Georgia, a test of wills ensued. As she recalls,

I... said that I had a message from the [US] President. “We are concerned about the rhetoric toward Tbilisi and the embargo,” I said calmly. “Any move against Georgia will deeply affect U.S.-Russian relations.” In an instant Putin stood up, peering over me. “If [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili wants war, he’ll get it,” he said. “And any support for him will destroy our relationship too.” It was a physical posture clearly meant to intimidate. So I stood up too and, in my heels, rose to five feet eleven over the five-foot-eight or so Putin. I repeated the President’s message. For a distended moment we stood there face to face – well, almost (Rice 2012, 532).

In essence, the two leaders were attempting to get across the message that they were willing to put their bilateral relations on the line for the sake of Georgia, and it is in the other side’s interest to back down first. To be credible, they “supplemented” their claims with postures (and perhaps tone and volume) that were meant to dominate emotionally, consciously or otherwise.

However, such emotions are not foolproof as a way to claim value. To begin with, they experience “diminishing returns” in payoff if one has established a reputation for becoming petulant easily and frequently; a counterpart would simply see yet another outburst as reflective of a leader’s character trait, or worse, that she has a tendency to manipulate others with her emotions, rather than a heartfelt demonstration of resolve (Wong Forthcoming). Moreover, when people are engaged in an emotional tug-of-war to claim value, it often reaches a point when some behavioral cues – a hesitation, stutter, averted gaze, etc. – betray either party as bluffing. In colloquial terms, someone has “blinked.”

The interaction between Britain Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and Khrushchev when the former visited Moscow in February 1959 offers an example of such dynamic.

In light of Khrushchev’s ultimatum on Berlin declared three months earlier (as discussed above), the primary objective of Macmillan’s visit was to get across the message that the Western powers were determined to stay in the German city, and to defend it militarily if the Soviet Union attempted to force them out. Relationship between the two leaders was amiable at first. But on the fifth day, they confronted each other head-on on Berlin. Tempers flared. Macmillan, in the words of one historian, had “lost his legendary composure” in warning Khrushchev about the prospect of war should he followed through with the ultimatum (Gearson

1998, 71). Khrushchev, in response, “leapt to his feet and shouted: ‘You have insulted me!’” (Horne 1989, 125). The Soviet leader was “clearly disturbed and angry,” according to Macmillan (1971, 614).

Macmillan, however, thought that he had called Khrushchev’s bluff, perhaps as a result of certain telltale signs in the latter’s emotional expressions. Macmillan wrote in his memoir, “Khrushchev began to show, or perhaps simulate, real anger... I was never sure at this or at other meeting with him how far this ebullition of temper was genuine” (Macmillan 1971, 611). In a letter sent to Eisenhower later that day, he wrote: “I think that I had a pretty useful conversation... and that it left him [Khrushchev] disappointed” (Geelhoed and Edmonds 2004, 219-220). Heated exchange resumed when the two leaders met the following day. But again, Khrushchev’s impassioned claim of resolve was far from convincing. Macmillan, as he later relayed to his biographer, felt that “[t]here was a pause,” as Khrushchev was “uncertain whether to work himself up into a new pitch of rage or let things calm down” (Horne 1989, 125-6). Khrushchev suspended his ultimatum several days later.

Emotions that bind

Once leaders have gone through the stage of “positioning,” they need to bind each other to an agreement. No further negotiation – or renegotiation – is allowed. The display of emotions such as *exasperation*, I argue, confers credibility to the claim that a leader has already reached her limit. She stands firmly by what has already been agreed upon, and if there were to be any agreement, that would be it. As Morris and Keltner argue, exasperation at a counterpart’s “indecision or eleventh-hour demand... obliquely convey an accusation of ‘bad faith’ or betrayal” (Morris and Keltner 2000, 33-34). Moreover, psychologists have shown that expressions of *disappointment* elicit cooperation and compliance (Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead 2006; Van Kleef and Van Lange 2008; Lelieveld et al. 2011; Van Doorn, Van Kleef and Van der Pligt 2015), because a show of disappointment evokes guilt in a counterpart for her behavior in the negotiation (Lelieveld et al. 2013).

Consider how Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic reacted when, on the final day of the Dayton Accords negotiation in November 1995, he learned that his Bosnian and American counterparts had breached an important guiding principle of their negotiation.

A year earlier, the three warring parties – and with the backing of the relevant major powers (the so-called “Contact Group” of US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) – had formally agreed to a 51-49 split of Bosnian territory between the Bosnians and Croats on the one hand, and the Serbs on the other. The challenge at Dayton would be to come up with an acceptable way to divide up the land. Over the course of the negotiation, however, the Serbs had made more territorial concessions than they realized. According to Richard Holbrooke, the chief American negotiator, the Americans would have to stand by the 51-49 principle when push came to shove. Implicit in his explanation, however, was that he and the others were conspiring to make Milosevic to accept less. He wrote later: “Were we still bound by 51-49? Given that the Serbs had conquered so much territory through infamous methods, it would have been just for the [Bosniak-Croat] Federation to control more than 51 percent of the land” (Holbrooke 1998, 295).

When the negotiation was coming to an end, on Day 19, Milosevic came across a chart which, according to Holbrooke, was perhaps “a deliberate provocation” by the Bosnians or “simply a stupid oversight.” On the chart, it reads: “FEDERATION TERRITORY INCREASED FROM 50% TO 55% DURING DAYTON TALKS.” Immediately, Milosevic walked to Holbrooke’s room and “entered without warning.” “‘You tricked me,’ he said angrily. ‘You didn’t tell me that the percentage is no longer 51-49. I asked you but you didn’t reply. I saw your charts. How can I trust you?... I can do many things... but I cannot give you more than fifty-one percent. This is my bottom line... We agreed to this before Dayton” (Holbrooke 1998, 295-6). For the rest of the day, the parties were busy coming up with a split of the territory that would comply with the 51-49 principle (Holbrooke 1998, 296-9).

The negotiation between US Secretary of State James Baker and Syrian President Hafez Assad over a proposed peace conference on the Middle East in the spring of 1991 offers another example of how expressions of exasperation and disappointment can bind a counterpart to an agreement.

The two leaders had undergone several rounds of meeting by the time they met again on May 11. On that day, however, Baker learned that Assad was reconsidering two important concessions he had agreed to earlier. In Baker’s mind, Assad had “crossed the line.” Finding it acceptable, he “slammed [his] portfolio shut with all the intensity [he] could muster,” announced his departure, and continued: “We’ve exhausted the subject. We’re back where we started from. I

would not be human if I did not tell you I am disappointed. Because of your insistence, there will be no peace negotiations. But I thank you for your time. I hope to see you again sometime.” “For the first time,” Baker recalls, “Assad seemed a trifle defensive” (Baker 1995, 460-2).

Emotions that show commitment

Finally, the expression of such emotions as *worry* and *fear* that a deal might fall through suggests that one intends to honor it. Research in psychology has shown that these emotions often elicit cooperative behaviors from a counterpart (Van Kleef, De Dreu and Manstead 2006). Such emotional dynamic was evident in the final phase of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when behind the scene, US President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev were seeking to negotiate a way out of their impasse through their surrogates, the President’s brother Robert Kennedy and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin respectively.

According to Dobrynin, his final meeting with Kennedy on the evening of October 27, 1962, was “critical” to ending the crisis (Lebow and Stein 1994, 126).¹¹ In that meeting, Kennedy reaffirmed American resolve to take out Soviet nuclear capabilities in Cuba. In return, however, he also pledged – verbally – that the US would not invade Cuba and that the Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be removed in several months’ time. But if talk is “cheap,” as is often assumed in IR, why would Dobrynin – and through him, Khrushchev – believe in such a pledge and therefore assent to the immediate halt of Soviet nuclear buildup in Cuba? In fact, when Khrushchev produced a letter for the President two days later seeking to confirm the *quid pro quo*, Robert Kennedy met with Dobrynin. “It is possible,” Kennedy said, according to Dobrynin’s diplomatic cable to Moscow that day, “that you do not believe us and through letters you want to put the understanding in writing.” But he and the Americans, he noted, “were not prepared to formulate such an understanding in the form of letters, even the most confidential letters” (Dobrynin 1962b). Clearly, trust was low after the bitter experience of the crisis; even Robert Kennedy could see why his pledge might be seen as incredible.

One explanation for why the Soviets were convinced of the American intentions to “seal the deal” on October 27, I argue, was Robert Kennedy’s emotional performance. In his memoir, Dobrynin remembered Kennedy as someone “who often lost his temper” (Dobrynin 1995, 61). In another important meeting earlier on during the crisis, Kennedy was “in a state of agitation.” The

¹¹ This episode is also discussed in Wong (2016, 158-9), albeit in lesser detail.

ambiance was tense, and “[t]his tension was accentuated by the fact that Robert Kennedy was far from being a social person and lacked a proper sense of humor... [H]e was impulsive and excitable” (Dobrynin 1995, 81-83). In that fateful meeting on October 27, however, he behaved very differently. Dobrynin telegrammed Khrushchev shortly after: “R. Kennedy was very upset; in any case, I've never seen him like this before. True, about twice he tried to return to the topic of ‘deception’ (that he talked about so persistently during our previous meeting),” accusing the Soviets of installing missiles in Cuba. But in that meeting, “he did so in passing and without any edge to it. He didn’t even try to get into fights on various subjects, as he usually does, and only persistently returned to one topic: time is of the essence and we should not miss the chance” to come to an agreement (Dobrynin 1962a). Such detailed description of Kennedy’s emotional state is all the more remarkable considering the fact that diplomatic cables are usually concise and “to the point,” reporting the “cold” facts of what was and was not communicated rather than the personal dynamics that transpired in an interaction.

Kennedy’s anxiety made a lasting impression on Dobrynin. He “was very nervous throughout our meeting,” Dobrynin remembered three decades later. “It was the first time I had seen him in such a state” (Lebow and Stein 1994, 138). Dobrynin reckoned that his dispatches “obviously reached him [Khrushchev] and had their intended effect, because some are cited vividly in his memoirs” (Dobrynin 1995, 76). Indeed, in his account of this “culminating moment” of the crisis, Khrushchev described Kennedy as “[i]n a state of great nervous tension... [and] kept appealing for prudence and good sense” (Khrushchev 2007, 339). The argument here is not that emotions singlehandedly accounted for how the Cuban Missile Crisis ended. Other factors were obviously also at play. But Dobrynin – and through his report to the Kremlin, Khrushchev – would probably not be as trusting of Kennedy’s otherwise “costless” pledge had he not be able to observe the latter’s emotional appeal up close. After all, Khrushchev had advised another of his emissaries to Washington, Georgi Bolshakov, earlier on during the crisis: “You’ve got to take note of everything – the tone, gestures, and conversations” (Taubman 2003, 556).

Conclusion and suggestions for future research

In this article, I move beyond the general claims that emotions, diplomacy and interactions at the “micro” level of leaders “matter” in determining the larger outcomes of

international politics – claims that, as discussed in the introduction, a number of scholars across various research agendas have put forth recently in response to the literature’s longstanding neglect of these factors. Taking a step further, I argue that there is in fact a wide repertoire of emotions exchanged when leaders negotiate in person. These emotions communicate different intentions, and as such, enable leaders to overcome the different relational problems they encounter. I have illustrated my argument with a number of episodes of face-to-face diplomacy from recent history. Without the exchange of emotions, leaders in these episodes would find it difficult to understand each other’s intentions, and as such, making the search for an agreement in an otherwise antagonistic relationship even more difficult.

Intellectually, scholars of IR, particularly those who seek to illuminate the role that face-to-face diplomacy plays in international politics, would find their understanding of the practice’s inner logic incomplete, if not ontologically flawed, if they fail to account for its emotional dynamics. Indeed, emotions are critical to social engagement, in a negotiation or other mixed-motive settings (Van Kleef and Sinaceur 2013). They have a positive role to play in international politics. As Lebow put it, the academic literature “has stressed... [the] negative influence [of emotions]... on behavior” – they are often cast as anathema to rational problem-solving, sound judgments and constructive relationships. “The time is long overdue... to acknowledge and study the positive contribution of emotions, harnessed to reason, order and cooperation” (Lebow 2008, 515). This article is a step in that direction.

Substantively, I have only scratched the surface on the subject of emotions in face-to-face diplomacy. There are a number of promising avenues of inquiry in this young research program. I briefly outline five of them.

First, I have structured my argument along the four stages of relational problems. But this framework is adopted only for heuristic purposes. Reality is more complicated. Negotiations rarely unfold as “neatly,” in a linear fashion from initiation to commitment with all the emotions expressed, exchanged and equally salient. This is because leaders may proceed with – and sometimes backtrack on – the negotiation over not only one but multiple issues, with each issue presenting a different relational problem to the parties involved at any given time (for instance, a leader may express disappointment over a counterpart’s attempt to renege on an issue and at the next moment express liking to initiate negotiation over another). Moreover, preliminary research in psychology suggest that how one sequences her expressions and what “mix” of emotions she

expresses could lead to divergent outcomes. This is because what a target ultimately makes of an expression – and how she reacts to it – is not only a function of what it conveys *per se* but also what comes before and after (Jervis 2001, 16).

For instance, Filipowicz, Barsade, and Melwani (2011) have shown that someone who transitions from being happy to being angry over the course of a negotiation would claim more value than one who remains angry throughout. This is because her counterpart would be more inclined to consider her emotional transition a reaction to how the negotiation is progressing. Conversely, being angry too often and too easily – that is, to be seen as a “hothead” – may backfire, such as by making a counterpart more likely to walk out of a negotiation (Yip and Schweinsberg 2017). Take Khrushchev as an example. The Soviet leader had perhaps fallen victim to his frequent outbursts and had trouble convincing others of his seriousness when he truly needed to communicate resolve and claim value (Wong Forthcoming).

On the other hand, being emotionally unpredictable – that is, exhibiting no consistent pattern or logic in the expressions of positive (e.g. happiness) vs. negative (anger) emotions – may extract more concessions. This is because a leader who behaves that way would be seen as irrational (Sinaceur et al. 2013).¹² Research has also suggested that someone (in this case, an interrogator or a bill collector) who uses an “emotional contrast strategy” – the simultaneous expressions of positive emotions to engage and negative emotions to compel – is more successful in making an otherwise reluctant target to comply (Rafaeli and Sutton 1991). There is anecdotal evidence for the benefits of such “good cop, bad cop” strategy (even when played by the same person) in international politics. For example, Reynolds (2007) concludes from his study of the Camp David summit between Begin and Sadat that its outcome, which was generally seen as more favorable to Israel than to Egypt, “was ultimately determined not by Carter [as the mediator] but by Begin’s consummate skill as a negotiator” (283). The Israeli leader was known for “[s]hifting adroitly between courtesy and obduracy” (6). “If Begin had been unremittingly obnoxious,” Reynolds (2007) remarked, “that would have been counterproductive. But on other occasions he could be friendly and studiously courteous” (350). Holbrooke (1998) has made a similar observation about Milosevic as a formidable negotiator at Dayton. The Serbian leader

¹² See McManus (Working Manuscript) for a recent application of the “madman” theory in IR, albeit not in the context of face-to-face interactions.

“could switch moods with astonishing speed... He could range from charm to brutality, from emotional outbursts to calm discussions of legal minutiae” (114).

Emotional expressions, then, should not be studied in isolation (as is the case with most of the works in psychology referenced in this article). Their meaning is fully determined only in relations to their larger context, a qualification that – the handful of research discussed in the two previous paragraphs notwithstanding – psychologists have only begun to take into account seriously (Van Kleef and Stéphane Côté 2014; Hareli, David, and Hess 2016; Greenaway, Kalokerinos, and Williams 2018; Fang, Van Kleef, and Sauter 2018). If this article is an improvement from the general claim that “emotions matter” in IR with its more fine-grained understanding of the communicative functions of different emotions, an appropriate next step would be to examine how different sequencings and mixes of expressions produce worse or better outcomes, inadvertently or deliberately as a negotiation strategy by the leader concerned.

Second, psychologists have long demonstrated that individuals vary in their ability to understand, control and express their own emotions and read and recognize those of others; they have different levels of “emotional intelligence” (Goleman 1996). Are emotionally intelligent individuals more likely to achieve successful outcomes in negotiations because of their ability to better communicate and ascertain intentions? Research on this topic is scant, but the findings thus far would suggest so (Foo et al. 2004; Jordan and Troth 2004; Elfenbein et al. 2007; Elfenbein 2013). Leaders may differ in their emotional intelligence as well (Greenstein 2000, 194), and a number of scholars have hypothesized that this could affect their performance in a negotiation (e.g. Wong 2016, 155; Holmes 2018, 262-3). An interesting research agenda would be to subject these hypotheses to more systematic analysis and empirical testing.

Third, how would the cultural background of leaders influence the way that emotions are expressed and perceived, and perhaps as a result of such differences in background, misinterpreted (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993, 197-8; Hampson, Crocker and Aall 2013, 330)? Preliminary research in psychology has shown that the culture mediates how emotions are expressed and read, including in the context of a negotiation (Kopelman and Rosette 2008; Hajo, Shirako, and Maddux 2010; Luomala et al. 2015). Americans, for instance, often expect others to put on a smile in interpersonal interactions (especially in a first meeting), but not as much so for the Soviets or the Russians. When President Roosevelt met with Stalin at the Tehran conference in 1943, he went on a “charm offensive” and thought that he had established rapport with the

Soviet leader when the latter, normally a stoic, “smiled vaguely” (Stearns 2016, 49). But was his assessment correct? On the other hand, what did Stalin make of Roosevelt’s emotional appeal given his knowledge (or lack thereof) of the prevalence of smiling in American culture?

Fourth, are certain leaders more prone to rely on their personal (including emotional) interactions with others as evidence of intentions (Yarhi-Milo 2014, 250; Holmes 2018, 54)? Or does that depend on how centralized is a counterpart’s power and control in the overall formulation of foreign policy? For instance, the expressions of a dictator (think, Stalin) in face-to-face diplomacy would presumably be more reflective of a country’s intentions than a democratically elected leader who is accountable to and constrained by multiple audiences at home (Rosen 2005, 158-9; Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth 2018).

Finally, the world has witnessed and will continue to experience the development and spread of novel information and communication technologies. In the introduction, I have argued, and practitioners concur, that diplomacy is best practiced face-to-face because interpersonal contact is “lossless”; it supplies rich information about intentions – including emotional expressions – that are otherwise attenuated or distorted if relayed through other channels. Indeed, research in business and management has shown that despite the increasing ease and availability of videoconferencing, face-to-face meeting is still a preferred mode of communication, especially if the tasks involved are complex and the participants are not yet acquainted with each other (Denstadli, Julsrud, and Hjorthol 2012). But how would future innovations in holographic technology, which seeks to create as “real” as possible the physical presence of an otherwise distant object (including the expressions of an interlocutor), affect negotiations among leaders?¹³ The answer is by no means straightforward, as technological advances do not always lead to more efficient and optimal outcomes. They can even be counterproductive, as Adler-Nissen and Drieschova (Forthcoming) demonstrate recently in the case of the use of word processing software in negotiations. These, I argue, are some exciting topics that scholars may wish to pursue in the future.

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